China lays legal groundwork to ready society for war

Hong Kong : As an authoritarian state, China has advantages when it comes to passing stringent and Orwellian laws. Primary amongst them is the reality that ordinary Chinese citizens have absolutely no ability to resist or avoid them. That is the case with the nation’s newly revised National Defence Mobilisation Law, which was rubber-stamped by China’s top legislature on 28 August 2026.
This particular law will come into effect on 1 October, and it gives Chairman Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) carte blanche to enlist any help or seize whatever resources they want from individuals or private companies in the event of a contingency such as war or conflict.
In fact, this law is something of a hangover from Mao Zedong’s theory of the “people’s war”, for the party wants the whole nation to come together in time of crisis to fight and resist. Furthermore, it is not just about preparing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for war, but readying the whole country for conflict.
To this end, China created the Central National Security Commission in January 2014, and it has implemented a bevvy of legal regulations to coordinate resources, to beef up national security and to prepare for war. In doing so, the CCP has shored up and consolidated power under the name of the national security apparatus.
This commission helped enact China’s National Security Law in 2015, the National Intelligence Law in 2017, and the Data Security Law in 2021. These regulations give the Chinese state sweeping powers to do pretty much what it wants if it invokes the matter of national security. No citizen, no employee, no company, no organisation is exempt from the mandates of these laws.
The National Defence Mobilisation Law contains 14 chapters and 82 articles, and this represents its first update since its introduction in 2010. According to Chinese state media, the law “clarifies the functions and responsibilities of military and civilian authorities in national defence mobilisation under the new system. It also improves the national defence mobilisation system to better meet national defence and security needs, coordinate with economic and social development, and connect with emergency response mechanisms.”
But what exactly is national defence mobilisation? China defines it as “activities in which the state, in response to threats to national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, security and development interests, takes necessary measures in accordance with the law to ensure a rapid transition between peacetime and wartime, and convert economic and social strength into national defence capabilities”.
Samantha Hoffman, writing for The Jamestown Foundation think-tank in the USA, noted that the law’s revisions target six areas: improving general provisions (e.g. upholding party leadership), adjusting the organisational leadership structure, improving the basic work system for mobilisation, establishing a reserve forces build-up and conscription system, improving the strategic material reserve system, and strengthening the national defence mobilisation propaganda and education system.
She wrote, “The new revisions ensure that the party leadership can, at any time, activate the full weight of the country’s military, civilian, economic and social resources and direct them toward strategic objectives.” If a conflagration occurs, for instance, Xi can wield national power as a single, coherent force.
At its heart, China is fusing national development and national defence interests. The 2010 law aimed to protect sovereignty, unification, territorial integrity and security, but the 2026 version adds “development interests” too. In CCP parlance, “development interests” encompass economic security, resource access, overseas assets and technological development, as well as territorial threats.
Hoffman further noted, “This change aligns the law with the 2020 revised National Defence Law, which already permits the mobilisation system to be triggered when the state’s development interests are threatened, confirming that this mechanism also covers development interests.”
The updated law spans things such as organisational leadership bodies and their powers, national defence mobilisation planning, the reserve and mobilisation of personnel for the armed forces, military research, and the requisition and expropriation of civilian resources and compensation.
Theresa Fallon, Director of the Centre for Russia Europe Asia Studies in Brussels, sounded an alarm on X, saying, “It is far more difficult to ignore the gathering storm of war. The National Defence Mobilisation Law of the People’s Republic of China was updated on August 28, 2026, effective from October 1, 2026. This is a wartime national defence law. Has the depletion of US military stockpiles, Russia’s war in Ukraine, Israel/US war on Iran tipped Xi into thinking the time is ‘getting ripe’?
Despite such stark warnings, and however alarming some clauses in the 2026 law appear, most parts of the regulations are not that different from the original version. For example, the provision saying “men 18-60 and women 18-55 must perform national defence service” is a mere repetition of the 2010 law. As Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, pointed out, “In fact, almost all the clauses on civilian obligations to mobilise are the same as the 2010 law.”
Incidentally, there is no age limit on individuals with specialised knowledge and skills who might need to be called up. Yet Morris went on to say, “There are a lot of new clauses related to Xi’s role in mobilisation and data management that need to be unpacked. But folks need to stop hyperventilating about this being a new preparation for war. This preparation has been evolving for over a decade, since the 2010 law.”
There are some changes, of course. Hoffman, in her report for The Jamestown Foundation, suggested the most significant changes are in Articles 3 and 16, which place the national defence mobilisation system under the auspices of the CCP’s Central Committee. This is in contrast to the responsibility previously residing within the State Council and Central Military Commission. This clearly delineates that party leadership and authority trump all else.
Elsewhere, civilian resources could previously be “requisitioned”, but now they can be “expropriated and requisitioned”. This includes facilities, equipment, vehicles, venues or any other asset the government wants. Any refusal or delay in handing over what the CCP demands will result in compulsory enforcement and/or fines. In a similar vein, the authorities promised: “efforts will focus on ensuring strict compliance and establishing supporting regulatory systems”.
China’s law extends to ordinary citizens, enterprises, social organisations, strategic materials, military production capacity, professional support and any other element that China wishes to enlist into the national defence mobilisation system.